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In cases alleging disability discrimination in the provision of state and local
government services, courts frequently hold that plaintiffs’ claims depend on the
question whether, despite the disadvantage that government actions impose, the
plaintiffs nevertheless receive meaningful access to the government services. Whether
people with disabilities actually have meaningful access is in reality a factual
question, one on which social science and other empirically supported facts should
matter. But courts frequently ignore evidence about the nature and level of access
that people with disabilities have to government programs when decisions regarding
those programs are being challenged. This Article catalogues judicial decisions that
bypass, or conversely, engage in the empirical inquiry. The Article considers several
types of cases, including those concerning limits on government medical assistance,
an issue of particular salience in the current political climate. The Article draws the
conclusion that the better-reasoned decisions are those that take social science and
other relevant evidence seriously in determining whether meaningful access is
afforded.
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INTRODUCTION
Judicial decisions frequently invoke the idea of meaningful access
in cases alleging disability discrimination in the provision of public
services. Courts hold that disability discrimination laws guarantee
persons with disabilities meaningful access to government programs
and benefits, and that denial of meaningful access violates those laws. 1
Conversely, if disabled persons’ access to the services is unequal but still
“meaningful,” courts often deny that the government has discriminated
on the basis of disability. 2
In Alexander v. Choate, 3 the Supreme Court ruled that a budget cut
limiting the number of hospital days covered under a state Medicaid
program did not violate Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 4
despite the adverse impact it had on Medicaid-eligible individuals with
disabilities, who disproportionately needed longer hospital stays. 5 The
Court said that the state’s Medicaid program provided meaningful
access despite the limit, so there was no actionable disability
discrimination. 6 Though it is the leading case, Choate is not an isolated
one. Many influential court decisions under Section 504 and Title II of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 7 interpret the meaningfulaccess standard so as to uphold governmental decisions to refuse to
modify a variety of public programs, saying that public agencies need
not go further to accommodate people with disabilities than to provide
whatever services they already offer. 8 Other decisions apply more
demanding approaches to meaningful access and require extensive

See infra text accompanying notes 47–67.
See infra text accompanying notes 22–46.
3 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
4 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).
5 See Choate, 469 U.S. at 290.
6 Id. at 302.
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165 (2012). For the purposes of the present discussion, it may be
assumed that the duties imposed by Section 504 and ADA Title II are the same. See Mark C.
Weber, Disability Discrimination by State and Local Government: The Relationship Between
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 36 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1089, 1101–03 (1995) (comparing Section 504 with ADA Title II).
8 See cases cited infra notes 22–46. Meaningful access ideas have formed the basis for
denial of claims under other legal provisions as well. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176
(1982) (interpreting federal special education law to require no more than meaningful access to
education for child with disability); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973) (upholding dramatically unequal per-pupil funding for different school districts against
equal protection challenge, noting that all students had access to education).
1
2
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modifications in public programs to accommodate people with
disabilities. 9
Whether a person or class of persons has meaningful access to a
government service is fundamentally an empirical question. How great a
negative effect does a government decision have to have on people with
disabilities in order to deny meaningful access? For a class-based claim
like that in Choate challenging cutbacks in government benefits, a
number of social research questions would be relevant: How many
persons with disabilities are affected, how many experience a complete
denial of services, how many suffer partial denials of services or the need
to make do with inappropriate services that nevertheless confer some
benefit, what losses do the complete and partial denials of services cause,
what substitute services are offered, and how effective are the substitutes
in comparison to the beneficiaries’ needs? 10 Similar information ought
to be provided regarding people without disabilities if the gist of the
claim is that the decision affecting the benefit has a disparate negative
impact. 11 For individual claims of discrimination, the questions might
See cases cited infra notes 47–67.
This does not answer the question whether, in the absence of class-based proof of
negative impact, the specific individuals who are negatively affected would still have valid
claims. It would appear that a given individual with a disability could show that the failure to
modify the challenged rule denies that person meaningful access to a public service, and so that
person’s case could proceed and would be analyzed in the same manner as the individual cases
discussed in the text. There may be some basis for caution on this point, however, for in
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 603–07 (1999), the Supreme Court allowed a
potential partial defense based on the difficulty of providing community services to all similarly
situated persons at once in a case in which two individuals claimed that the failure to provide
community-based services to them violated the ADA’s mandate that public services be
provided in the least restrictive setting appropriate to the needs of the persons served.
11 Though this information may be needed for a disparate impact claim, as a general matter
Section 504 and the ADA do not require plaintiffs to show that there is a person or class of
persons without a disability that has been treated better than the person or persons with a
disability. Olmstead, 571 U.S. at 598 & n.10 (“We are satisfied that Congress had a more
comprehensive view of the concept of discrimination advanced in the ADA.”); N.M. Ass’n for
Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847, 854 (10th Cir. 1982) (“We find no language in
the statute or regulations suggesting that proof of disparate treatment is essential to establishing
a Section 504 infraction in connection with the educational rights of handicapped children.”).
In the context of an individual employment discrimination claim, the Supreme Court has
described the reasonable accommodation duty as a form of preference needed to achieve
equality. U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397–98 (2002). See generally Mark C. Weber,
Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1119, 1137–39, 1151–52,
1175–78, 1176 n.289 (2010) (discussing accommodations as preferences and considering
different perspectives on that issue in extant scholarship). The law of disparate impact disability
discrimination remains underdeveloped, something two prominent scholars pointed out almost
a dozen years ago, Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Impact,
and Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861, 879–93 (2006), and some authorities suggest that questions
of meaningful access are more important to the success of disability discrimination claims than
those of disparate impact doctrine, see Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1996)
(“Rather than attempt to classify a type of discrimination as either ‘deliberate’ or ‘disparate
9

10
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be somewhat less sociological in nature, but they too are empirical and
involve social facts: What other resources are available, how effective are
they for the person with the disability, what losses result from failure to
have effective services, and how beneficial is the access for an individual
who does not have a disability?
Nevertheless, courts making determinations about meaningful
access often ignore even basic and readily found data on the impact of
government policies when the policies are challenged as discriminatory.
Judges decide cases with little knowledge about the effects of
government actions being upheld, even though a meaningful
meaningful-access standard would appear to mandate obtaining and
applying that information. For example, if the hospitals in Alexander v.
Choate routinely kept the patients after the coverage periods were up
and bore the costs themselves, the access to Medicaid for people with
disabilities would look far more meaningful than if the hospitals
discharged patients with disabilities in need of care out onto the street at
the end of the coverage period. 12
There is real salience at the present time to the problem of actions
by state and local governments that impose harm on people with
disabilities and the legal bases for challenges to those actions.
Threatened cuts in the federal support for the Medicaid program are
likely to cause States to make drastic cuts in eligibility and service
coverage, changes that will disproportionately harm people with
disabilities. 13 Other state and local programs that are critical for people
with disabling conditions are vulnerable in the current political
climate. 14 The success of legal challenges based on Section 504 and the
impact,’ the Court [in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 302 (1985)] determined it more useful
to assess whether disabled persons were denied ‘meaningful access’ to state-provided
services.”); P.P. v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1098, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2015)
(same). Apart from disparate impact cases’ application of the meaningful access idea, however,
the content of the ban on disparate impact disability discrimination is beyond the scope of this
Article.
12 See Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers, Debilitating Alexander v. Choate:
“Meaningful Access” to Health Care for People with Disabilities, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 447,
452–53 (2008) (noting Choate’s failure to consider actual impact of restriction on in-patient
days).
13 See infra text accompanying notes 68–76.
14 See, e.g., Andrew Taylor, Huge Cuts to Food Stamps Part of Trump’s Budget Proposal,
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS (May 22, 2017), https://apnews.com/1045fc89ff994896be212cc1d07
cb5d2. The high rate of poverty among persons with disabilities, see How Is Poverty Status
Related to Disability, U.C. DAVIS CTR. FOR POVERTY RES., https://poverty.ucdavis.edu/faq/howpoverty-status-related-disability (last visited June 7, 2017) (“In 2014, . . . [p]overty rates by
disability status for those ages 18 to 64 were 12% for those without a disability, 29% for those
with a disability.”), means that many cutbacks in antipoverty programs will disproportionately
harm people with disabilities; in addition, state programs that specifically benefit people with
disabilities or classes of people with disabilities are also on the chopping block, see Gregory
Wallace, Proposed Budget Cuts for 2017 Include AIDS, AmeriCorps Programs, CNN (Mar. 30,
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ADA may well depend on judicial determinations of whether people
with disabilities retain meaningful access to the services they need
despite slashes in support.
A number of thoughtful commentators have considered issues of
meaningful access in relation to discrimination against persons with
disabilities. Professors Francis and Silvers acknowledge that Supreme
Court case law suggests that meaningful access exists even though
disparate impacts may disadvantage some recipients of government
health services, but they argue that the law as properly understood
requires fair equality of opportunity. 15 In work discussing Medicaidmanaged care initiatives, Professor Crossley suggests that proper
interpretation of the meaningful-access standard in that context calls for
overturning some service limits that managed care programs might
impose on beneficiaries when those limits disadvantage people with
disabilities. 16 She would rely on commitments to provide access that the
relevant state government agencies make in their applications for waiver
of ordinary Medicaid requirements; she concludes that any reneging on
those commitments denies meaningful access. 17 Professor Bagenstos
considers various restrictive decisions of the courts regarding
government services for people with disabilities to be applications of an
access-content distinction, by which courts require modifications to
allow access to programs and services, but are reluctant to alter the
content of what is offered once formal rights to participate in a program
are obtained. 18 He suggests moving past a traditional discrimination
framework in advocating for greater modifications of public and private
services to accommodate people with disabilities. 19 All of these
discussions, though they draw on social science research in any number
of respects, leave to the side whether empirical evidence can give
meaning to the application of the meaningful-access standard itself.
Hence the need to address that question. 20
2017,
9:01
AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/29/politics/donald-trump-budget-cuts/
index.html (“Many of the proposed cuts are to grant programs, meaning that if enacted, states,
universities and non-profit organizations could find themselves seeking additional funds on
their own or cutting programs to make up the difference.”).
15 Francis & Silvers, supra note 12, at 447, 460, 466.
16 Mary Crossley, Giving Meaning to “Meaningful Access” in Medicaid Managed Care, 102
KY. L.J. 255, 257 (2014).
17 Id. at 279–80.
18 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 46–48 (2004); see
Jessica L. Roberts, Health Law as Disability Rights Law, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1963, 2003 n.193
(2013) (“Bagenstos identifies Choate as the advent of the ‘access/content’ distinction he
explores in much of his work on disability rights law.”).
19 Bagenstos, supra note 18, at 54–70.
20 Other authorities also discuss meaningful access in connection with disability
discrimination claims. E.g., Mary R. Anderlik & Wendy J. Wilkinson, The Americans with
Disability Act and Managed Care, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 1163, 1220 (2000) (“Using the Choate
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I submit that when would-be beneficiaries challenge limits to and
exclusions from public programs on grounds of disability
discrimination, courts considering meaningful access should defer to
triers of fact, that is, judges or juries, as appropriate under the applicable
law. In turn, triers of fact should heed social science evidence about the
actual impacts of the government decisions on access to services. 21
Part I of this Article will analyze cases in which courts reject
disability discrimination challenges to actions by state and local
government on the basis of reasoning that the actions did not deny the
plaintiffs meaningful access, but in which the courts did not make a
meaningful empirical inquiry as to the access that the plaintiffs actually
had. Part II discusses contrasting cases in which courts made a deep
investigation into the true effect on the level of access that the state and
local government decisions afforded. Part III discusses how courts have
treated restrictions on programs providing medical assistance, an issue
of special importance for people with disabilities in the present political
situation.

‘criteria,’ plaintiffs should prevail in disparate impact cases where they can show that effective
treatment for conditions affecting persons with disabilities (or particular disabilities) is not
possible within the challenged constraints, that is, that they are being denied meaningful access,
while the impact on the general, able-bodied population is minimal or nonexistent.”); Wendy F.
Hensel & Leslie E. Wolf, Playing God: The Legality of Plans Denying Scarce Resources to People
with Disabilities in Public Health Emergencies, 63 FLA. L. REV. 719, 745 (2011) (“Protocols that
categorically exclude individuals with specific disabilities from receiving medical care in the
event of a pandemic clearly do not meet the ‘meaningful access’ standard articulated in
Choate.”). An extensive student commentary catalogues various approaches courts have taken
to meaningful access in health care and analogous areas and suggests there should be at least
some access for all in Medicaid managed care programs under a “readily accessible” standard.
Alexander Abbe, Comment, “Meaningful Access” to Health Care and the Remedies Available to
Medicaid Managed Care Recipients Under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, 147 U. PA. L.
REV. 1161, 1198 (1999); see also Spenser G. Benge, Note, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care
Act: An Effective Means of Combatting Health Insurers’ Discrimination Against Individuals with
HIV/AIDS?, 13 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 193 (2016) (discussing whether insurers’ practices with
respect to coverage of treatment for HIV infections deny meaningful access so as to constitute
discrimination under Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act standards).
21 This is not to deny that normative issues also exist. How much of a harm may be
imposed, or conversely, how much of a benefit should be conferred, are questions about the
depth of the commitment of society, through enactments such as the ADA, to equality for
persons with disabilities. But at least if the measure of the harm or benefit is measured, the
normative questions can be brought into relief and made ready for determination. An
interesting parallel to the role of empirical inquiry in statutory disability discrimination cases
may apply to the role of social science evidence in constitutional cases, as with the study by
Kenneth and Mamie Phipps Clark and other materials cited in Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483, 494 & n.11 (1954), and the controversy whether the Court should have relied on
the materials. For a compact discussion of the issue in Brown, see KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN &
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 678 (15th ed. 2004).
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I. A NEED FOR EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: THREE CASES
Three cases are representative of those in which courts reject
claims of denial of meaningful access to public services or benefits. In
each of these, there should have been a role for empirical information as
to how meaningful the access was.
Wright v. Giuliani is a prominent class action case in which
homeless individuals with HIV infections or AIDS sought emergency
housing that would accommodate needs arising from their conditions,
such as storage for medication and refrigerated food facilities for those
who had to take food with medication. 22 The district court denied a
preliminary injunction and the Second Circuit affirmed, citing Choate
and the meaningful-access standard. 23 As the Second Circuit noted, a
doctrinal dispute existed over whether the plaintiffs’ claim was for
reasonable accommodations in an existing program to permit them
meaningful access when people without disabilities had access, or
whether they were seeking a new benefit not provided to others. 24 In
questioning the likelihood of the plaintiffs’ success on the merits, the
court stressed the absence of record evidence about the adequacy of
emergency housing afforded persons without disabilities, evidence that
the court said would help define the nature of the right being asserted
and would also be relevant to whether the requested remedy would
constitute a fundamental alteration. 25
The Second Circuit’s emphasis on the lack of evidence points out
the close relationship between the empirical and the doctrinal in
resolving questions of meaningful access. If meaningful access is simply
a code word for “no new benefits for people with disabilities,” then the
adequacy of the benefits currently afforded those without disabilities
becomes profoundly important. But there seemed to be no dispute in
the Wright case that people without disabilities were being afforded
emergency housing, however poor it might have been in relation to their
needs. The gist of the plaintiffs’ claims was that housing was afforded
them, but it did not meet their needs at all, due to the specific and
pressing necessity for medicine and food storage that individuals
without disabilities did not have. Here the real evidentiary deficiency
was facts about the prevalence of those needs and whether they were in
230 F.3d 543, 545 (2d Cir. 2000) (describing needs and requested accommodations).
Id. at 547–48. Though the lower court denied the preliminary injunction motion, it also
denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss and permitted plaintiffs to replead with respect to
their class certification motion. Wright v. Giuliani, No. 99-10091, 2000 WL 777940, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2000).
24 230 F.3d at 547.
25 Id. at 548–49.
22
23
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reality critical to the population of people with HIV infections. Access to
housing in which critical medical needs cannot be met is not meaningful
access to housing, and information on the nature of the needs and the
depth of the inadequacy of the service being offered is crucial on that
issue.
A second illustrative case is Louis v. New York City Housing
Authority, an individual action involving a different kind of housing
assistance, in which a mother and her children alleged that she needed
reasonable accommodations to enable her to obtain housing under the
Section 8 rental voucher program. 26 She stated that she was mentally ill
and had experienced a stroke and seizures, and that her son had a lung
disease requiring monitors, ventilators, and other medical equipment. 27
She sought an emergency transfer to different housing, alleging that her
landlord sexually harassed her, then evicted her. 28 She said that the
defendant’s offer of vouchers for renting a new apartment did not
provide her meaningful access to housing that could handle her son’s
medical apparatus, and she requested more direct assistance. 29
Ultimately, she lost Section 8 eligibility and was homeless at the time of
the decision. 30
The district court dismissed the ADA accommodations claim after
citing Choate and its meaningful access language. It said that the
benefits of the Section 8 program, which provides vouchers for rent in
privately owned apartments to people who qualify, did not include
provision of housing or making modifications in private housing. 31
Tellingly, the court was willing to assume “that some assistance with
locating accessible housing may in certain circumstances be necessary to
allow individuals with disabilities to overcome obstacles to meaningful
participation in the Section 8 program.” 32 It nevertheless said that the
plaintiffs failed to allege what obstacles related to their disabilities
prevented them from locating housing or specifying what
accommodations would have afforded them an equal opportunity to
obtain housing. It appears that evidence on the nature of the housing
market, that is, on the character of the units available at the rent levels
and under the regulatory constraints of the Section 8 program, could
26 152 F. Supp. 3d 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). The Section 8 program is provided for under the
Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 653 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437a
(2012)).
27 Louis, 152 F. Supp. 3d at 147.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 148.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 153. The court cited other grounds in dismissing the claim, including statute of
limitations, id. at 149, and insufficient allegations as to the disability of the mother, id. at 150.
32 Id. at 155.

WEBER.39.2.8 (Do Not Delete)

2017]

MEANINGFUL ACCESS

12/4/2017 6:33 PM

657

have led the court to conclude that the Section 8 program failed to
provide meaningful access to those with disabilities because of the
program’s lack of accommodation to the failure of the housing market
to respond to their needs. That evidence may have led the court to
determine that a modest modification, perhaps in the form of personal
assistance in finding housing or relaxing some of the restrictions on
which housing could be covered, would be needed to achieve
meaningful access for the plaintiff.
A third case, Jones v. City of Monroe, affirmed the denial of a
preliminary injunction requested by an individual with multiple
sclerosis seeking an all-day on-street parking space near her
workplace. 33 The plaintiff could walk using a cane for only short
distances and typically used a wheelchair for mobility. 34 Free all-day
parking was available two blocks from the workplace, but that was too
far for her to travel. 35 Free one-hour parking with designated spaces for
those with disabilities was closer, but did not meet her needs to be at
work all day. 36 The court upheld the finding of a lack of likelihood of
success on the ADA claim, citing Choate and saying that the benefit
afforded by the city was one-hour parking adjacent to downtown
businesses for their patrons and longer-term parking farther from the
businesses for others, including the businesses’ employees. 37 Arguing
that the plaintiff was afforded meaningful access to free downtown
parking at specific locations, the court said that she had no right to free
downtown parking allowing her access to the destination of her
choice. 38 The court also said that forcing the city to stop enforcing the
one-hour limit on the spaces near the plaintiff’s office would be a
fundamental alteration, because the parking ordinance was otherwise
valid. 39
The dissent relied on factual material that the majority neglected:
There were 110 of the one-hour spaces, so apparently the effect on the
downtown businesses of dedicating one space for all-day parking by the
plaintiff was miniscule. 40 Data on whether the removal of the one space
would actually harm merchants who depend on turnover of parking
33 341 F.3d 474 (6th Cir. 2003), abrogated in part not relevant by Anderson v. City of Blue
Ash, 798 F.3d 338, 357 n.1 (6th Cir. 2015).
34 Id. at 475.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 477–78.
38 Id. at 478–79.
39 Id. at 480. It is difficult to reconcile this statement with the reality that any Title II claim
for reasonable modification of existing rules will entail the cessation of enforcement of
otherwise valid laws. See, e.g., Dadian v. Vill. of Wilmette, 269 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2001)
(requiring waiver of rule against driveways that open directly on street front).
40 Jones, 341 F.3d at 482 (Cole, J., dissenting).
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spaces and the ready availability of spaces near businesses would have
established the point beyond any doubt. Evidence on what other
comparable cities have done to accommodate persons who need all-day
parking near specific locations would also have been helpful. The
dissent commented that the closest all-day space with a restriction for
exclusive use by those with disabilities was 592 feet from the plaintiff’s
building, too far for her to manage. 41 The majority, it seems, did not
consider this fact relevant. Other facts, including whether there might be
availability of a space somewhere not so far but not interfering with
merchants’ needs, would also be pertinent. The city provided huge
amounts of free parking, but attention to empirical evidence could have
established that the plaintiff lacked any meaningful access to it, and
would likely have established as well that access could be provided with
modifications that would inflict no perceptible harm on anyone.
These are far from the only examples. Other instances in which
courts have denied ADA Title II or Section 504 claims include one
challenging a lifetime cap on mental health coverage under a federal
employee benefit program, 42 cases challenging the failure to provide
services needed by diabetic children at a neighborhood public school 43
and a city-run summer camp, 44 a case challenging a policy of providing
non-credit-bearing academic intervention classes at school at times
when they conflicted with credit-bearing courses that students with
disabilities needed in order to graduate on time, 45 and others. 46 In each
Id.
Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (in Section 504 challenge, upholding
lifetime cap of $75,000 for mental health benefits under government employee benefit plan
applicable to Foreign Service, saying that meaningful access standard was met). Cases of this
type may return if the protections in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act are
repealed. See infra text accompanying notes 68–70 (discussing potential new limits on medical
assistance programs).
43 R.K. v. Bd. of Educ. of Scott Cty., No. 09-344-JMH, 2014 WL 4277482 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 28,
2014) (granting summary judgment against student with diabetes placed by school district in
non-neighborhood school because neighborhood school to which student otherwise would
have been assigned lacked full-time nurse, despite argument that non-medical personnel at
neighborhood school could have been trained to monitor student and assist with insulin
injections; holding that student failed to create jury question whether school’s actions met test
of reasonable accommodation, reasoning that meaningful access to education was afforded),
aff’d, 637 F. App’x 922 (6th Cir. 2016).
44 Medina v. City of Cape Coral, 72 F. Supp. 3d 1274 (M.D. Fla. 2014).
45 B.C. v. Mount Vernon City Sch. Dist., No. 11-1411, 2014 WL 4468082 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28,
2014), aff’d, 660 F. App’x 93 (2d Cir. 2016). The court of appeals did consider statistical
evidence regarding the plaintiffs’ proposed class, and in a separate opinion concluded that the
evidence regarding students with disabilities eligible under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400–1482 (West 2017), did not sufficiently relate to the claims
asserted on behalf of the class of children covered by Section 504 and the ADA. B.C. v. Mount
Vernon City Sch. Dist., 837 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2016). The court did not discuss the U.S.
Department of Education regulation providing that all students considered children with
disabilities for purposes of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act are covered by
41
42
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of these cases, there was a lack of useful empirical information on just
how meaningful any access to the services actually was.
II. USING SOCIAL EVIDENCE: SOME CONTRASTING CASES
In contrast, a number of judicial opinions rely on social science
data and other empirical evidence in finding a lack of meaningful access
to government services and benefits. Several of these cases illustrate the
point.
National Federation of the Blind v. Lamone affirmed a ruling that
Maryland denied meaningful access to absentee voting by affording only
paper ballots that needed to be marked by hand, in violation of the ADA
and Section 504; the court further affirmed the lower court’s
determination that providing an online absentee ballot-marking tool
that was accessible to blind people was a reasonable modification. 47 The
Board of Elections had developed the online marking tool and used it
for a limited number of voters in the 2012 election, but did not vote by
the necessary supermajority to certify its use in accordance with state
law requirements. 48
The district court held a three-day bench trial and received
extensive empirical evidence. The Fourth Circuit summarized the
proceedings:
The district court found that “the evidence demonstrated specific
difficulties that some disabled voters have experienced while voting,”
and that “under the current absentee ballot voting program,
individuals with disabilities such as those of the Plaintiffs cannot vote
privately and independently.” The district court credited the results
of a University of Baltimore usability study that concluded the tool
was “highly accessible for disabled voters,” though the district court
Section 504. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(l)(2) (2017) (“Qualified handicapped person means: . . . With
respect to public preschool elementary, secondary, or adult educational services, a handicapped
person (i) of an age during which nonhandicapped persons are provided such services, (ii) of
any age during which it is mandatory under state law to provide such services to handicapped
persons, or (iii) to whom a state is required to provide a free appropriate public education
under section 612 of the Education of the Handicapped Act.”).
46 See, e.g., S.P. v. Fairview Sch. Dist., No. 13-96E, 2014 WL 4924885 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30,
2014) (in case of former student subject to incapacitating migraine headaches that prevented
his regular attendance at school, sua sponte granting school district summary judgment on
claim that school district violated student’s right to education with non-disabled peers,
determining that existing accommodations, including availability of Refocus Room at school
and enrollment in cyber courses at home, met standards of Section 504 in light of inability of
student to attend school on frequent occasions when headaches occurred); see also cases cited
infra notes 77–82, 91 (discussing claims concerning medical assistance and related topics).
47 813 F.3d 494 (4th Cir. 2016).
48 Id. at 499–500.
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acknowledged that two individuals testified that they had difficulty
accessing and using the tool during a public demonstration period.
The district court found the tool “compatible with reasonably up-todate computer and screen access software,” “designed in accordance
with the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines,” and “compatible
with refreshable Braille displays.”
....
With respect to the security risks posed by the online ballot marking
tool, the district court credited expert testimony that the tool
“exhibited software independence, meaning a change to the voting
software used for an election cannot cause an undetectable change to
the outcome of an election” and that “there were no additional risks
that did not exist in other methods already available to Maryland
voters.” The district court found that the tool was “not without some
security risks” including that “malware could enable [a] third party to
observe a voter’s selections” and that “a voter’s selections could be
captured if a third party infiltrated the Board’s server during the time
a voter’s selections and/or the printable ballot were being
transmitted.” Additionally, “[t]here was no evidence at trial that the
online ballot marking tool had been tested against intentional
attempts to infiltrate or hack into the Board’s server or the tool.” 49

The court had to resolve the question whether to evaluate
meaningful access with regard to voting processes as a whole or with
regard to absentee voting, ultimately reasoning first that Choate
cautioned against defining public programs so as to overlook problems
with achieving access to public services, and second that since anyone
may vote absentee without providing a justification, absentee voting is
the relevant program. 50 The court relied on ADA regulations requiring
equal opportunities to participate and noted that voters without
disabilities may mark their absentee ballots without assistance and with
complete privacy, something blind voters may not do without an
accommodation like the one requested. 51 But for the historical and
social impact evidence on the obstacles to voting for people who are
blind and the technical evidence on the effectiveness of the proposed
accommodation, the outcome of the case might well have differed. 52
Id. at 501–02 (page citations to record on appeal omitted).
Id. at 504 (noting Choate’s citation with approval of government’s statement, “The
benefit itself, of course, cannot be defined in a way that effectively denies otherwise qualified
handicapped individuals the meaningful access to which they are entitled.” Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 n.21 (1985)).
51 Id. at 506.
52 A case similar to Lamone found a denial of meaningful access, but went on to hold that
the requested accommodation constituted a fundamental alteration, relying on facts regarding
Ohio voting system certification that differed from those relating to Maryland. Hindel v.
49
50
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A second case that contrasts with the set of authorities that did not
use social science evidence is California Foundation for Independent
Living Centers v. County of Sacramento, in which the district court ruled
that a municipal airport denied meaningful access to persons using
wheelchairs due to its gate counter design and the failure to have an
adequate evacuation plan. 53 The opinion featured an extensive
discussion of the admissibility of evidence submitted in support of
cross-motions for partial summary judgment, both lay and expert
testimony. 54 In all but one aspect of the evacuation plan, the challenged
operations were found to deny meaningful access, with the court relying
extensively on the empirical evidence about customer interactions at the
counters and the deficiencies in the plans for evacuation in case of
emergency. 55
In a direct contrast to the Jones v. City of Monroe case cited above,
a third case, Bassilios v. City of Torrance, ruled that the failure to provide
a disability-designated street parking place adjacent to the apartment of
the plaintiff, a person with cerebral palsy whose walking abilities were
severely limited, denied her meaningful access to city services. 56 The
court cited specific evidence about distances from alternative parking
places and the difficulty of traveling from them to the apartment on
foot, including stairs, steep slopes, and difficult terrain. 57 The court also
cited evidence that the city had not designated any street parking spaces
in residential areas from 1999 to 2015 and that there were no such
places in the entire city. 58 Although the city was willing to establish a
twenty-minute parking restriction between 8:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. on
Monday through Saturday for the space in front of the apartment and to
exempt the plaintiff or others with disabled parking placards from the
twenty-minute limit, the space was frequently occupied by cars without
the placard and could be occupied without restriction in the hours not
covered by the restriction. 59 Notably, the empirical evidence included
not only the physical and historical facts about the parking situation but
also the simple mathematical calculation that under the current regime
the parking space had no restrictions about seventy percent of the
Husted, No. 15-3061, 2016 WL 2735935 (S.D. Ohio May 11, 2016). The court of appeals
reversed that decision, however, ruling that the issue was not suitable for resolution in a motion
for judgment on the pleadings. Hindel v. Husted, No. 17-3207, 2017 WL 5244256 (6th Cir. Nov.
13, 2017).
53 No. 12-03056-KJM-GGH, 2015 WL 6744659 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2015).
54 Id. at *1–6.
55 Id. at *14–15 (counters), *18 (evacuation plan).
56 No. 14-03059-AB, 2015 WL 10570160 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2015).
57 Id. at *2.
58 Id.
59 Id.
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time. 60 The court pointed out the absence of evidence supporting the
city’s assertions that the existing restrictions on the space would meet
the plaintiff’s needs. 61
Other cases in which the courts were sensitive to empirical
evidence and the social impact of challenged practices include disputes
over the closing of a public rehabilitation center, 62 the failure to provide
needed social services to persons with HIV infection, 63 another voting
accessibility case, 64 an additional disaster planning case, 65 a case
concerning telephone communications, 66 and a case concerning access
to education for a child with behavioral disabilities. 67
The bottom line is that numerous courts and cases have
approached meaningful access solely as a matter of legal interpretation
or judicial assumption and have predictably concluded that meaningful
access was offered. But a fair number of other courts, likely encouraged
by alert advocates, have embraced social science and other empirical
evidence about what constitutes meaningful access under the facts of the
cases before them. In the cases identified here, those courts have gone
on to find that the government policies being challenged denied
meaningful access to services or benefits.
III. THE SPECIAL CASE OF LIMITS ON MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS
An issue of particular concern is the use of empirical evidence in
cases challenging government denials of one or another form of medical
assistance. This subject is of acute importance at the present time. First,
it is the situation that bears the closest analogy to Alexander v. Choate,
in which the Supreme Court, without considering factual inquiry,
rejected a challenge to a Medicaid cutback stating that meaningful
access to services was being afforded. Second, it is a situation that is
highly likely to arise in the near future. Congress is considering
abolishing the traditional open-ended cost sharing between the federal
60
61
62
63
64
65

2013).

Id. at *12.
Id.
Rodde v. Bonta, 357 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2004).
Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2003).
Disabled in Action v. Bd. of Elections, 752 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2014).
Brooklyn Ctr. for Indep. of the Disabled v. Bloomberg, 980 F. Supp. 2d 588 (S.D.N.Y.

66 Henning v. Cty. of Santa Clara, No. 15-05171-NC, 2017 WL 1036729, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 17, 2017).
67 A.G. v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69, 815 F.3d 1195, 1206 (9th Cir. 2016)
(stating that expert testimony supported claim that student needed accommodations “to have
meaningful access to her education”).
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government and the states, and replacing that arrangement with block
grants capped at existing levels of federal Medicaid expenditures, subject
only to increases for state population growth and the overall rate of
inflation. 68 Since Medicaid-covered costs increase at a greater rate than
other costs of living, and the numbers of those in need in a state may
increase more quickly than the general population, the likely effect is a
proportional decrease in federal support, which the states will need to
make up for either by increasing their own spending or by cutting
costs. 69 Cost-cutting could include dropping groups of currently eligible
individuals or reducing services, or both. 70
These steps would uniquely harm people with disabilities, who
spend comparatively larger amounts 71 of their comparatively smaller
incomes72 on medical care. Accordingly, the State actions may be
vulnerable to ADA disparate impact or reasonable modification
challenges. There are also ongoing debates about whether the ADA
provides the basis to challenge existing state restrictions on Medicaid
benefits, including limits on home and community-based services,
constraints found in managed care arrangements, conditions imposed
on Medicaid coverage expansion, and other features of government
medical assistance programs that disadvantage persons with
disabilities. 73 People with disabilities making the challenges will need to
68 Sarah Kliff, Donald Trump’s Plan To Cut Medicaid Spending, Explained, VOX (Jan. 23,
2017, 10:11 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/29/13778622/price-trumpmedicaid-block-grants.
69 See id.; see also Haeyoun Park, In One Chart: Trump Plans To Cut Medicaid After
Promising Not To, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/
24/us/politics/trump-medicaid-budget-cuts.html?rref=collection%2Fnewseventcollection%
2Fahca-american-health-care-act-repeal-obamacare&action=click&contentCollection=
politics&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=8&pgtype=
collection&_r=0 (“Mr. Trump is proposing to cut $610 billion from Medicaid benefits. This
could come on top of more than $800 billion in cuts to Medicaid sought in the health care
overhaul bill passed by the House on May 4.”).
70 See Kliff, supra note 68. Past experience in times of budget crisis supports this prediction.
See David Orentlicher, Medicaid at 50: No Longer Limited to the “Deserving” Poor?, 15 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 185, 193 (2015) (“[F]iscal pressures led thirty-eight states to reduce
or restrict Medicaid eligibility between 2002 and 2005. States also have responded to fiscal
pressures by reducing benefits and decreasing payments to physicians who provide care to
Medicaid recipients.”).
71 See Sophie Mitra et al., Extra Costs of Living with a Disability: A Systematized Review and
Agenda for Research, DISABILITY & HEALTH J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 6), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2967775 (last updated Nov. 7, 2017).
72 Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al., Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the
United States: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 9 (2011), https://
www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-239.pdf. (“In 2010, 9.5 percent of householders (8.8
million) aged 18 to 64 reported having a disability. . . . The median income of these households
was $25,550 in 2010, compared with a median of $58,736 for households with a householder
that did not report a disability.”).
73 Compare Steimel v. Wernert, 823 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 2016) (reversing summary judgment
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respond to the argument that they nonetheless enjoy meaningful access
to the medical assistance services.
The success of the response hinges on their ability to show that, as
a matter of fact, they do not. Some basic realities are established: The
population covered by Medicaid has a higher incidence of disability
than the population served by private insurance, and although persons
with disabilities constitute fifteen percent of the Medicaid population,
they account for forty-two percent of expenditures. 74 About half of the
national population of people with disabilities depends on public health
insurance programs such as Medicaid and Medicare. 75 It remains open
for dispute whether and how courts will use these and other facts. 76
As is true for disputes involving other state and local government
services, extant cases include those in which courts appear to have
ignored or not been presented with social science data relevant to
for defendants in case challenging restrictions on Medicaid home and community-based
services), with Amundson v. Wis. Dep’t of Health Servs., 721 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2013)
(affirming dismissal of action challenging cuts to group home services funded by Medicaid on
basis of ADA and Section 504). See generally sources cited supra notes 15–16, 20 (discussing
controversies over application of ADA to potentially discriminatory features of public
programs, including those offering medical care). For a description of the Medicaid program in
general and its relation to community-based services in particular, see Sara Rosenbaum et al.,
Olmstead v. L.C.: Implications for Medicaid and Other Publicly Funded Health Services, 12
HEALTH MATRIX 93, 124–30 (2002) (also discussing fundamental alteration defenses). The
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), provided
strong incentives for states to expand coverage of Medicaid to those who do not meet the
categorical standards of disability, age, or being or having dependent children, and not only
those who are poor but also the near-poor. See generally Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts,
Medicaid Expansion as Completion of the Great Society, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. SLIP OPS. 1, 3
(describing expansion and declaring that “Medicaid is now universal”). For discussion of how
the anti-discrimination provision of the Affordable Care Act, if it is not repealed, may provide
protection against harmful restrictions on private insurance, see Valarie K. Blake, Restoring
Civil Rights to the Disabled in Health Insurance, 96 NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript at 36–42); Sidney D. Watson, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act: Civil Rights,
Health Reform, Race, and Equity, 55 HOW. L.J. 855, 870–84 (2012); Benge, supra note 20.
74 Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid and the Uninsured, People with Disabilities and Medicaid
Managed Care: Key Issues to Consider, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 2 (Feb. 2012), https://
kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8278.pdf (discussed in Crossley, supra
note 16, at 258 n.23).
75 Nancy A. Miller et al., The Relation Between Health Insurance and Health Care
Disparities Among Adults with Disabilities, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, Mar. 1, 2014, at e85, http://
ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/full/10.2105/AJPH.2013.301478 (cited in Blake, supra note 73,
manuscript at 10 n.45) (“Adults with disabilities are much more likely to have public, relative to
private, coverage—50.5% public and 43% private coverage nationally in 2010 (some individuals
have both public and private coverage).”).
76 One valuable effect of the Affordable Care Act, if it survives, is that information about
health differences among disadvantaged groups will, over time, become much more readily
available. See Elizabeth Pendo, Collecting New Data on Disability Health Inequities, HASTINGS
CTR. REP., Mar.–Apr. 2016, at 7 (“Prior to the ACA standards, inconsistent or incomplete data
limited our ability to track the status of health and health care within or for disadvantaged
populations.”).
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meaningful access, and those in which the court received and applied
the evidence. As with the other cases, courts that take social science and
other empirical evidence seriously tend to find a lack of meaningful
access from the arrangements being challenged.
A major category of cases comprises those that challenge the
adequacy of plans to provide home services or other less restrictive
options to persons who are in nursing homes or state institutions by
reason of their disability, or who are at risk of institutionalization. Arc of
Washington State Inc. v. Braddock is a key example. 77 As that case
indicates, home and community-based services may be funded under
Medicaid options often referred to as “Medicaid waiver,” but the
number of funded slots is typically limited under state plans. 78 These
waiver services, nevertheless, may be crucial in permitting a person with
disability-related needs to live in a community setting rather than a
nursing home or state institution. As the Supreme Court established in
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, offering government services only
when a recipient is in an institutional setting violates Title II of the
ADA, which requires States to provide services in the most integrated
setting appropriate to the needs of persons with disabilities. 79
In Arc of Washington State, the plaintiffs argued that maintaining
the current cap on the number of waiver slots violated the ADA,
because anyone who did not receive a waiver slot could obtain needed
medical and other services only if placed in an institutional
arrangement. They asked the court to order state officials to request
federal authorities to increase the number of slots. The court looked to
the increase in the number of openings and the amounts spent on home
and community-based services over twenty years and declared that the
State’s commitment to deinstitutionalization appeared genuine. That
was enough, in the court’s view, to satisfy ADA Title II as interpreted by
Olmstead, which said that a State would not be subject to remedial
action if it “were to demonstrate that it had a comprehensive, effectively
working plan for placing qualified persons with mental disabilities in
less restrictive settings, and a waiting list that moved at a reasonable
pace.” 80
The court thus avoided even asking whether individuals with
disabilities were afforded meaningful access to services or benefits, and
instead approached the issue simply as whether the requested relief was
a fundamental alteration; even on that question the court relied solely
on the growth of the community-based program and the inference that
77
78
79
80

427 F.3d 615, 621–22 (9th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 617.
527 U.S. 581 (1999).
Id. at 605–06.
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Washington’s intentions were pure. The State’s intentions should have
been beside the point, 81 and the relevant questions were really the
empirical ones of how great a need remained unmet (the question of
meaningful access for persons with disabilities) and how difficult it
would be for the State to enlarge the program (the question of
fundamental alteration). The court did not look to social science or any
empirical evidence at all on either question. The same court applied a
similar approach in a case concerning payment levels for services in
California’s program. 82
Other cases have taken a more fact-focused approach and looked to
the reality of the unmet needs for services. In Frederick L. v. Department
of Public Welfare, the court of appeals reversed a judgment in favor of
Pennsylvania in a class action suit alleging failure to provide adequate
services to permit placement of institutionalized individuals into
community settings. 83 In that case, the lower court had found that the
requested relief constituted a fundamental alteration, relying in part on
the immediate costs of more community placements. The court of
appeals noted that the view had to be longer term, 84 but significantly, it
rejected the plaintiff’s challenge to the extensive, evidence-based
analysis of costs that the lower court undertook. 85 Instead, it relied on
the fact—essentially a political fact—that the State had no
comprehensive plan for placing individuals in less restrictive settings. 86
This fact was in evidence at the trial, but it was the court of appeals’
approach to the issues that singled it out as decisive.
Makin ex rel. Russell v. Hawaii is another noteworthy decision
stressing the need for social and individual fact development in an
ADA-based claim for medical assistance services in community
settings. 87 There the court found material questions of fact about what
would constitute reasonable modifications and whether the
modifications would fundamentally alter the State’s program. 88 It left
open for evidentiary development whether meaningful access was
81 See Mark C. Weber, Accidentally on Purpose: Intent in Disability Discrimination Law, 56
B.C. L. REV. 1417, 1440–45 (2015) (noting absence of intent or animus requirement for ADA
Title II and Section 504 claims).
82 Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming summary judgment against
plaintiffs on ADA and Section 504 claims based on failure to pursue maximum Medicaid
waiver amount so as to stimulate greater provider participation).
83 364 F.3d 487 (3d Cir. 2004).
84 Id. at 495 (“We . . . hold that if the District Court’s opinion is read as focusing only on
immediate costs, as Appellants contend, it would be inconsistent with Olmstead and the
governing statutes.”).
85 Id. at 499.
86 Id. at 500.
87 114 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (D. Haw. 1999).
88 Id. at 1035.
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currently being provided, and noted that reasonable accommodations
may be needed to assure that people with disabilities have meaningful
access. 89 Other cases have relied on social or individual facts in
upholding claims for services delivered in non-institutional settings. 90
Cases where restrictions on medical assistance have been
challenged under the ADA and Section 504 are not limited to
deinstitutionalization and home and community-based services claims.
There are any number of cases in which courts have upheld existing
medical assistance arrangements, saying that they afforded meaningful
access or were otherwise not contrary to disability non-discrimination
mandates. 91 There are also a significant number of cases where the
courts made the opposite determination or said that the claims hinged
on additional factual development. 92 It is not always true that greater
development and use of social facts will compel a finding that
meaningful access has been denied, but in general, the cases that are
more sensitive to social and individual facts about how difficult it is to
obtain needed services tend to find violations of the ADA and Section
504. In any instance, if the question is one of meaningful access, the
inquiry itself has to be meaningful.

Id. at 1036.
See, e.g., M.R. v. Dreyfus, 697 F.3d 706 (9th Cir. 2012) (overturning denial of preliminary
injunction and remanding in a case challenging a state regulation reducing the amount of inhome personal care services provided through Medicaid).
91 E.g., Rodriguez v. City of New York, 197 F.3d 611, 618 (2d Cir. 1999) (overturning
injunction in class action challenging failure of city to include safety-monitoring services to
Medicaid recipients who were individuals with disabilities; holding that state is not obligated to
provide benefits to particular group when it does not provide the benefits to any group; stating,
“The ADA requires only that a particular service provided to some not be denied to disabled
people”); Lincoln CERCPAC v. Health & Hosps. Corp., 147 F.3d 165, 168 (2d Cir. 1998)
(affirming dismissal of Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims brought by disabled children who
were transferred from one rehabilitation center to another with fewer services because “the
disabilities statutes do not guarantee any particular level of medical care for disabled persons,
nor [do they] assure maintenance of service previously provided”).
92 E.g., Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., 335 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 2003) (overturning grant
of summary judgment to state agency in plaintiffs’ challenge to policy ending unlimited
provision of medically necessary prescription benefits for people with disabilities receiving
community-based Medicaid services and at risk of institutionalization while state continued to
provide similar benefits to persons who had been institutionalized); Lovell v. Chandler, 303
F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding damages award in challenge to changes in eligibility for
state health insurance); see Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2012) (overturning
preliminary injunction but otherwise permitting action to proceed based on allegations that
new rule restricting provision of Medicaid-covered personal care services violated ADA Title II
and Section 504).
89
90
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CONCLUSION
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the more persuasive judicial
decisions are those that take evidence of meaningful access—or its
denial—seriously. Access to housing, access to parking, access to private
absentee voting, access to airport counters, and access to medical
services all are meaningful or not depending on facts about the
environment and facts about disabling conditions of the persons making
claims of discrimination. The analysis furnished here does not challenge
Alexander v. Choate’s interpretation of the disability discrimination laws
so as to require plaintiffs, at least in cases challenging broad-based
policies regarding government benefits and services, to show a denial of
meaningful access. But the cases discussed demonstrate that social and
other facts are of profound importance in evaluating the issue of denial
of meaningful access, and that just results require more extensive and
more careful examination of the social science by finders of facts in
disputes of this type.

